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Political Campaign Financing:
Tax Incentives for Small Contributors
Ellen A. Peters*
One of the most important responsibilities of a democratic
society is to safeguard the integrity of its electoral system. The
democratic blueprint must be implemented so as to assure free,
equal, and meaningful access to the polls. The 85th Congress
has made great strides in this direction by the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1957 to protect the right to vote of all our
citizens.' But the ability to vote is no guarantee of its meaningful exercise, or, for that matter, of its exercise at all. It is to
this end that our political campaigns are directed. 2 The proper
conduct of such campaigns is a vital stimulant to the optimal
functioning of the electoral process. Yet on this subject, congressional action does not seem to be forthcoming.
One major problem in political campaigning today concerns
campaign financing. 8 This is a problem which has become more
*Assistant Professor of Law, Yale Law School. The author wishes to acknowledge her thanks for the generous assistance and advice of Professor Frank
C. Newman, School of Law, University of California, and of the Study Group in
Money and Elections which he conducted at Berkeley in the spring of 1950.
1. 71 STAT. 634 (1957). Title IV of the act is particularly aimed at protection of the right to vote. See H.R. REP. No. 291, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957),
reprinted in 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3502.
2. "Political campaigns . . . are the primary instrument through which public
opinion exerts its influence on the men and measures of government. The purpose of an election is simple. It is to decide who our public officials are to be.
The purpose of the campaign is equally simple. It is to help insure that this
decision will be a wise one. A choice between candidates would be meaningless
if we knew nothing about their qualifications, their records, and their ideals. In
the campaign, the politician has a chance to present his ideas systematically and
intensively, and the public has the opportunity to compare and to take account."
Kelley, Afterthoughts on Madison Avenue Politics, 17 ANTIOCH REV. 173 (1957).
3. For general discussions of this subject, see FORD, REGULATIONS OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE (1955) ; HEARD, MONEY AND POLITICS (1956) ; OvEsAcKEB,
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN FUNDS (1956) ; Bicks & Friedman, Regulation of Federal Election Finance: A Case of Misguided Morality, 28 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 975
(1953) ; Bottomley, Corrupt Practices in Political Campaigns, 30 B.U.L. REV. 331
(1950) ; Lederle, Political Committee Expenditure and the Hatch Act, 44 MICH.
L. REv. 294 (1945); Lucas, The Strength of Ten: Three-Quarters of a Century
of Purity in Election Finance, 51 N.W.U.L. REV. 675 (1957) ; Mitau, Selected
Aspects of Centralized and Decentralized Control over Campaign Finance: A
Commentary on S. 636, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 620 (1956); Neuberger, Campaign
Spending in the United States, in ENGLISH SPEAKING WORLD 22 (January 1953) ;
Note, Stautory Regulation of Political Campaign Funds, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1259
(1953) ; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the
[414]
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acute with each passing election year. Campaign expenditures
of tens of millions of dollars have become a commonplace in our
presidential and congressional election years' contests. 4 Expenditures of this magnitude are neither surprising nor unjustified
when we consider the number of potential voters and the degree
of apathy with which many of them regard platforms and candidates.5 To the extent that campaign expenditures succeed in
arousing voter interest and in getting out the vote on election
day, they are a worthwhile cost of democratic government, for
they produce election results more truly representative of the
wishes of the majority of the voting population than would otherwise be likely. Nonetheless, the very size of the sums involved
invites scrutiny not only of their ultimate use but also of their
origins. This raises the question of what campaign contributions
are proper. It is axiomatic that campaign expenditures require
Senate Committee on Rules and Administration on S. 636, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1955) ; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the
Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 84th Cong., 2d Seas. (1956)
(hereafter Gore Hearings) ; Hearings before the Special Senate Committee to
Investigate PoliticalActivities, Lobbying, and Campaign Contributions,84th Cong.,
2d Seas., and 85th Cong., 1st Seas. (1956-1957) (hereafter, McClellan Hearings).
Of. Newman, Money and Elections Law in Britain-Guidefor America?, 10 WEST.
POL. SCL Q. 582 (1957).
4. In the most intensive study of election financing ever undertaken, a Senate
committee headed by Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee found that $33,185,725
had been spent in the 1956 general election campaigns. Report of the Subeommittee on Privileges and Elections of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 85th Cong., 1st Seas. 2, 38 (1957) (hereafter Gore Report). Official reports filed according to law showed expenditures of $13,662.413 in 1954,
11 CONG. QUARTERLY ALMANAC 722 (1955) and $23,064,367 in 1952, 9 CONG.
QUARTERLY ALMANAC 51 (1953).
All commentators seem to agree that these figures are a substantial understatement of actual expenditures, and that at least $100,000,000 is probably spent
in presidential years. Professor Alexander Heard of the University of North
Carolina estimates that the total cost of the 1952 campaign on national, state,
and local levels was roughly $140,000,000. Gore Hearings, at 234. See also Phillips,
Election Fund Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1956, pt. IV, p. 6E, col. 1.
5. In 1956, according to the Bureau of the Census, there were 104,850,000 potential voters, of whom 80,168,364 were registered to vote, and 62,118,936 actually
voted. Thus only 77.4% of those registered to vote and 60.4% of those eligible
bothered to go to the polls on election day. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1956, p. 9,
col. 2, Oct. 29, 1956, p. 24, col. 1, Dec. 16, 1956, p. 54, col. 3. For voting trends
in other years, see WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 319 (1957). The highest
percentage of voters throughout the country was in Idaho, where 77.3% of the
eligible voting population cast their ballots. N.Y. Times, March 21, 1957, p. 32,
col. 7.
The 1956 voting record is particularly unimpressive in light of the concerted effort made by diverse groups to get out the vote. The Advertising Council spent
some $10,000,000 for this purpose (N.Y. Times, June 22, 1956, p. 29, col. 7), and
much publicity was also given the subject by the American Heritage Foundation
and the AFL-CIO. Dawson, Nation Urged to Get Out Vote, Oakland (Calif.)
Tribune, Nov. 5, 1956, p. 42; N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1956, p. 54, col. 8.
On voting apathy in general, see Commager, Why Almost Half of Us Don't
Vote, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 28, 1956, p. 14; remarks of Daniel J. Flood,
102 CONG. REC. A 6562 (1956).
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campaign contributions from someone, somewhere. Increasingly we have come to recognize how critical, and how capable of

abuse, is the role of the financier of our political campaigns.
One alternative for the financing of campaigns we may discount from the outset. The sums involved in running a modern
election campaign preclude financing by the candidate himself.

Even if a few select multi-millionaires are capable of bearing this
cost, restriction of candidacy to them would obviously be unthinkable.

This means that the candidate must secure financing from
others. Who these others are and what influence they will have
over the candidate should he be elected are questions of some significance. We may, for the sake of convenience, refer to. these
financial backers as the candidate's financial constituency, whom
he represents as much as he represents his electoral constituency.

In the ordinary course of events, the existence of this dual constituency may not unduly influence the political actions of the
successful candidate. Financial supporters, as well as supporters

at the polls, generally back those candidates with whose basic
outlook they feel themselves to be in fundamental agreement.6
Yet new issues. constantly arise which were unanticipated at the
time of the electoral campaign and on which the successful candidate may be genuinely uncommitted. It is at this point that
the danger particularly arises that the financial constituency
may be in a better position than the electoral constituency to per-

suade the candidate of the merits of its point of view.7 Its ability
to exercise such an overriding influence depends largely on its
own internal cohesiveness. Hence the large campaign contrib6. Candidates supported because of their ready response to any and all pressures are hardly likely to be too faithful, in the event of their election, either to
their electoral constituency or to their financial constituency.
7. Ideally, of course, the statesman's first concern should go beyond either of
his two constituencies to the good of the country as a whole. As Sir Winston
Churchill put it, 8 PARLLMA NTARY AFFAIRS 302 (1955) : "The first duty of a
member of Parliament is to do what he thinks in his faithful and disinterested
judgment is right and necessary for the honour and safety of Great Britain. His
second duty is to his constituents, of whom he is the representative but not the
delegate. Burke's famous declaration on this subject is well-known. It is only in
the third place that his duty to the party organization or programme takes rank.
All these three loyalities should be observed, but there is no doubt of the order
in which they stand under any healthy manifestation of government."
But in fact the difficulty of discerning the common interest is often such that
more concrete interests closer to home are likely to prevail. The financial constituency is at least assured of access to the candidate it supported so that its
positon may be most advantageously presented to him. See HEARD, MONEY AND
POLITICS 14 (1956). This position may frequently fail to coincide with that of
the electoral constituency, particularly since there need be no geographical coincidence of the two constituencies.
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utor, the "big money" - big business, big union, or big oilman constitutes a grave threat to independent political functioning by
the successful candidate.
The potentially pernicious effect of some campaign contributions manifests itself in many ways through diverse pressures
on elected officials in the executive and the legislative branches
of the government. A striking example of the most primitive
form of pressure on a legislator occurred early in 1956 in the
now famous Case case. Senator Francis Case of South Dakota
was offered, and indignantly rejected, a campaign contribution
of $2,500 as a reward for an affirmative vote on the natural gas
bill, then pending before the Senate.8 Although the gift was not
explicitly predicated on a favorable vote, and although its tender
eventually resulted in achieving exactly the opposite, it would
be naive to ignore the inherently coercive intent of the donors. 9
In the words of the Select Committee which investigated the
incident:
"Contributions are entirely within the bounds of propriety
when the purpose for which they are given is the election of
the Member and not for the purpose of influencing his vote.
The circumstances here partake of a meaning making almost
inexorable the conclusion that the paramount motivation for
this contribution was interest in the natural gas bill as contrasted with aiding Senator Case's campaign."' 10
Further investigation of the lobbying activities of the gas and oil
interests has disclosed that the Case offer was by no means
unique;" this led eventually to veto of the natural gas bill by
the President because of the "arrogant tactics" of some of its
8. The Natural Gas Bureau Bill was H.R. 6645, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1957).
It purported to exempt independent producers and gatherers of natural gas from
rigid public utilities regulation under the Natural Gas Act.

9. The contribution was tendered to a South Dakota friend of Senator Case
by one John M. Neff, a Nebraska lobbyist for the Superior Oil Company of California. Neff made the contribution only after he had inquired about Case's view
on the gas bill, and after being reasonably sure that Case was going to vote for the
bill. Neff's funds came from Elmer Patman, an attorney for the Superior Oil
Company, who had received the funds from Howard Keck, President of the Superior Oil Company. Neff, Patman, and Keck all testified that the money was
offered "without strings" and Case himself refused to categorize the offer as a
bribe when he turned it down. For further details, see S. REP. No. 1724, 84th

Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), reprinted at 102 CoNG. REc. 14651 (1956).
10. Id. at 9.
11. Other similar offers were, for example, made to Senators Hickenlooper of
Iowa and Goldwater of Arizona. For further details on the operation of the oil

and gas lobby, see McClellan Hearings.
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advocates.12 It seems reasonable to suppose that these tactics
have not been unique to the gas bill and that large donors to campaign coffers have not always intended to be entirely altruistic
in their investments.
Existing legislative measures to limit the influence of "big
money" in campaign finance concentrate on direct discouragement or even prohibition of such contributions. The present Federal Corrupt Practices Act is a typical example.' s It prohibits
contributions by labor unions and corporations, 1 4 and limits individual contributions to $5,000.11 Detailed reports of contributions and expenditures are required of congressional candidates"
and national committees,' 7 in order that publicity and unfavorable public comment may act as a deterrent to overly large donations. Ceilings on expenditures by candidate' s and committee 19
provide an additional brake on campaign contributions by reducing the demand for them. The fact is, of course, that the federal
regulatory scheme has been completely ineffectual in achieving
its ends. 20 Tighter drafting and a more realistic framework of
12. The bill was vetoed by President Eisenhower on February 17, 1956. The
veto message is printed at 102 CONG. REC. 2793 and 2897 (1956).
For the principals in the Case case, there were further consequences; Neff,
Patman, and the Superior Oil Company were all indicted for violation of the Federal Lobbying Act. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1956, p. 1, col. 6. The defendants pleaded
guilty and were fined $2,500, $2,500, and $10,000 respectively. S. REP. No. 395,
85th Cong., 1st Seas. 10 (1957).
Overly enthusiastic financial sorties by supporters of the natural gas bill
brought about another faux pas in 1958. Early in February, Republicans in Texas
held a $100-a-plate appreciation dinner for House Republican Leader Joseph W.
Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts. Texans were openly asked to contribute to this
dinner so that Martin would throw his power and influence behind the new natural
gas bill (H.R. 8525) introduced by Representative Oren Harris in the First Session of the 85th Congress. Folliard, Texans Fete Joe Martin in Hope He Can
Ease Gas-Price Controls, in Washington Post and Times Herald, Feb. 11, 1958,
p. 1, col. 2; N.Y. Times, February 12, 1958, p. 1, col. 6, and p. 22, col. 3. In the
ensuing storm of protest, both the Republican National Committee and the Republican Congressional Finance Committee turned down the funds collected, and
the natural gas bill suffered another setback.
13. The basic act today is 43 STAT. 1070 (1925), 2 U.S.C. §§ 241-256 (1952).
This act was partially based on 34 STAT. 864 (1907).
14. 18 U.S.C.A. § 610 (1952). The prohibition of union contributions originated in the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943 ('the Smith-Connally Act), 57
STAT. 167 (1943). That provision was limited to the duration of the war and was
not made permanent until the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 159 (1947). When the
Judicial Code was enacted in 1948, this provision and others were taken out of
Title 2 and put into Title 18.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1952).
16. 43 STAT. 1072 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 246 (1952).
17. 43 STAT. 1071 (1925), 2 U.S.C. §§ 242, 244 (1952).
18. 43 STAT. 1073 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 248 (1952).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 609 (1952).
20. Statistics on large contributions from various sources were amassed by
the Gore Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the Senate Committee on
Rules and Administration. The Appendix of Part 2 of the Hearings of this Coin-
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ceilings on contributions and expenditures may achieve better
results .2 1 Such has been the main thrust of the various electoral
reform acts introduced in recent years. Yet none of these proposals has ever reached the stage of floor discussion, not even
the so-called Federal Elections Act of 1956 which, in the wake of
the public outcry over the Case case, received the co-sponsorship
22
of eighty-five senators.
mittee in 1956 contain the findings of Professor Alexander Heard of the University of North Carolina concerning the 1952 elections. The committee's own
findings about the 1956 elections are to be found in the 1957 Gore Report. The
1952 and the 1956 findings are essentially similar. For example, in 1952, 110 contributors each gave $10,000 or more, for a total of $1,936,867.72 (Hearings at
526), while in 1956, 318 contributors gave $5,000 or more, for a total of $3,809,689
(Gore Report at 67-71).
For discussion of the numerous techniques that have been devised to avoid the
statutory mandates, see testimony of Professor Heard, Gore Hearings at 242-243;
Norton-Taylor, How to Give Money to Politicians, 53 FORTUNE 113 (May 1956) ;
Those Who Came to Dinner, 102 CoNG. REC. A 1080 (1956); sources cited in
note 3 supra.
21. See, e.g., the favorable Florida experience under its new law-FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 99.161 (Supp. 1956) -described
in Roady, Florida's New Campaign Expense Law and the 1952 Democratic GubernatorialPrimaries, 48 AM. POL. ScI.
REV. 465 (1954). The Florida statute was declared constitutional in Smith v.
Ervin, 64 So.2d 166 (Fla. 1953), 67 HARV. L. REV. 887 (1954). Similar legislation exists also in Texas. 9 TEX. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 14.04 (Vernon 1952).
22. S. 3308, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1956), is set out, in one of its early versions, at 102 CONG. REC. 3441 (1956). This bill, and its House counterpart,
H.R. 9668, were essentially similar to S. 636 and H.R. 3139, introduced in the
first session of the 84th Congress by Senator Hennings and Representative Udall.
It was originally planned to present S. 3308 as a substitute to S. 636, since the
latter had already gone through committee hearings in 1955 and had been favorably
reported out of committee. S. REP. No. 624, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). Despite
an effort by Senator Mundt to work out a compromise on the controversial issue
of coverage of primaries - S. 3331, 102 CONG. REc. 3647 (1956) - no further
action of any kind was taken on this legislation. A number of factors undoubtedly
contributed to this inaction, including the appointment of the McClellan Special
Senate Committee to Investigate Political Activities, Lobbying and Campaign Contributions- see the remarks of Senator Langer at 102 CONG. REc. 2865 (1956) and the raising of certain constitutional objections by the United Auto Workers.
New legislation of similar tenor was proposed in the First Session of the 85th
Congress. S. 2150, introduced by Senators Hennings and Green, was favorably
reported out of committee on August 2, 1957. S. REP. No. 792, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1957). The provisions of S. 2150 follow closely the proposals of the old
S. 636 and S. 3308, as well as those of S. 1437, introduced in the current session
by Senator Gore, as a result of his election study. See note 4 supra. A companion
bill to S. 2150 was introduced by Representative Udall on July 9, 1957. H.R. 8608,
103 CONG. REC. 10061 (July 9, 1957).
All these proposed statutes provide for higher but stricter ceilings on expenditures and contributions, and for adequate reports of such expenditures and contributions. In addition, a new principle of authorization has been introduced to
fix responsibility for expenditures made on behalf of any candidate. Most of the
proposals, including S. 2150, would cover primaries as well as general elections.
Other related but less comprehensive legislation introduced on this subject in
the First Session of the 85th Congress includes S. 2311, introduced by Senator
Curtis (103 CONG. REc. 8280 (1957)), its companion bill H.R. 3629, introduced
by Representative Hiestand (103 CONG. REC. 838 (1957)), H.R. 1068, introduced
by Representative Boggs (103 CONG. REC. 197 (1957)), and H.R. 4763, introduced by Representative Clifford Davis (103 CONG. REc. 4763 (1957)).
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Although improvements in the existing statutory pattern
would certainly be welcome, one may entertain certain reservations as to their ultimate efficacy. Our tax laws have demonstrated that revisions rarely solve old problems without raising
new ones, and that avoidance and evasion must be expected if the
stakes are sufficiently high and involve sufficient numbers of
people. Some testimony on this point before the Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections in 1955 is illuminating. Discussing the then pending Senate Bill 636, a reform measure
essentially similar to current proposals, Samuel Lubell said:
"Completely foolproof controls are impossible, if only because
as soon as any law is passed, so many ingenious minds set
about devising ways to circumvent the law. The problem you
face in this regard calls to mind a true incident that happened
during our occupation of Germany.
"So many GI's were dabbling in the black market there
that our occupation authorities asked Washington for financial experts to devise a really tight system of currency control. One day two of these experts happened to be talking
over the plans they had made while riding in a jeep. The GI,
who was driving, kept laughing as these experts talked. Finally one expert asked, 'What's so funny? Are these plans
to keep GI's out of the black market so bad?'
"'Oh, no,' replied the driver, 'you fellows are smart
enough, but just remember that there are only two of you
and think how many there are of us.' ",28
Perhaps the time has come to consider ways of handling campaign finance which do not require the sanctioning process of
our criminal laws. If our aim is to provide the candidate with a
financial constituency of sufficient breadth and diversity so as
not to impair his political freedom should he be elected, there are
at least two different ways of achieving this aim. One is the
present system - the frontal attack limiting and discouraging
the "big money" from entering the scene. Another is to encourage and bring out the "little money"- to canvass and solicit
contributions for campaign funds from the average citizen. The
latter alternative is one that has never been seriously attempted
in the financing of national campaigns. 24 Yet, if it is feasible,
23. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the Senate
Committee on Rules and Administration, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1955).

24. It has been estimated that 20% of the total cost of all 1952 campaigns
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it has everything to recommend it. It is entirely permissive, so
that any candidate or political committee may use it or not as he
or it sees fit. It has the positive merit of directly involving a
greater percentage of the population in election campaigns than
now participate, for it seems extremely probable that personal
solicitation of contributions will be an effective political stimulant for the populace.
The experience of United Fund, Community Chest, and Red
Cross drives suggests that large scale collection of small contributions from millions of contributors is in fact perfectly feasible.
These organizations have learned to canvass sizable segments of
the population with considerable financial success. 25 This success
is not a matter of accident or a spontaneous result of general
good will toward charitable organizations. It reflects, rather, a
conscious and studied effort to educate the public to its social
responsibilities, an effort facilitated and fortified by adaptation
of the techniques of business organization and of mass advertising.28 Why can we not do likewise in financing our election campaigns? Is the election of the best possible public servants any
less the citizen's responsibility than his obligation to help provide for health, welfare, and education?
Widespread campaigns to collect political funds have sometimes been discussed, but have never been put to a realistic test.
There was of course the 1952 Ruml plan (named for its originator, Beardsley Ruml), which used the device of selling books
of $5.00 certificates for wide resale.2 7 Its very limited success it netted about $600,000 for the Democratic National Committee 28 - can be attributed to a number of different factors. For
came in gifts of $500 and larger. Testimony of Professor Alexander Heard, Gore

Hearings 234 (1956). In 1956, this percentage, according to available statistics,
was even higher. Exhibit 26 of the Gore Committee report shows that contributions of $500 or more totalled $11,037,514, approximately one-third, therefore, of
the total reported expenditures of $33,185,725. Gore Report 2, 26 (50), 26 (192),
26 (199).
25. United Community Funds and Councils of America, Inc., estimates that
in 1956 volunteer workers solicited gifts from more than 26,000,000 contributors
in some 2,000 communities. "Incomplete returns show that per capita giving to
community chests was $3.67; to united funds not including the Red Cross it was
$3.76; and to funds including the Red Cross it was $4.83." United Funds, 31
SocIAL SERVIcE REv. 210 (1957).
26. See Lurie, Private Philanthropy and Federated Fund-Raising, 29 SocIAL
SERVICE REv. 64 (1955) ; Shaffer, Joint Fund-Raising, 11 EDITORIAL RESEARCH
REPORT 691 (1955) ; These Fund Raising Tips Pay Off, 44 NATION'S BuSINESS
36 (March 1956).
27. See VAN DOREN, BiO MONEY IN LITTLE SUMS (1956).
28. Id. at 43. For an even lower estimate, see Hall, How to Finance Political
Campaigns Again, in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch of March 11, 1956, reprinted at
102 CoNG. REC. A2425 (1956).
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one thing, the drive did not get under way until two months be-

fore the election, and thus did not have the careful organization
and planning which the charitable campaigns have shown to be
essential. Then, too, the book sale and certificate resale device

may be unnecessarily cumbersome. And perhaps the completely
partisan nature of this effort may have limited its appeal.

Many of these difficulties would have been overcome by the
Graham plan. In an address before the School of Business of the
University of Chicago on June 1, 1955, Philip L. Graham, publisher of the Washington Post and Times Herald, proposed broad
solicitation of political contributions for all parties under the

auspices of the non-profit non-partisan Advertising Council of
America. 29 Each citizen was to be urged to contribute directly
to the party of his choice, without commingling of funds. 80 Although this plan initially was enthusiastically received both by
Democratic Party Chairman Paul M. Butler and Republican
Party Chairman Leonard W. Hall, 31 it never came to fruition.
Alleging premature disclosure by the Democrats, the Republicans
failed to appoint their four members to the bipartisan sponsoring committee which the Advertising Council required before it
would undertake its contemplated $10,000,000 advertising campaign.82 By January of 1956, both Butler and Graham conceded
29. The speech is reprinted as Graham, High Cost of Politics, 44 NAT. MtJNIC.
REv. 346 (1955).
The Advertising Council subsequently announced its willingness to make available about $10,000,000 of advertising time and space in all media, including radio,
television, newspapers, magazines and outdoor advertising signs. These advertisements, beginning four weeks before the national convention, and continuing for
about ten days after the candidates had been selected, would have urged every
citizen to make some campaign fund contribution to help the parties do their job.
30. The Graham plan thus contemplated a bipartisan rather than a non-partisan
method of collecting contributions. An experiment in nonpartisan political fundraising was tried in Minnesota in 1955 under the leadership of Byron G. Allen,
Minnesota Commissioner of Agriculture. Encouraged by the considerable success
of that effort, Allen subsequently urged a similar program on a national level.
The Allen plan called for congressional chartering of a national foundation,
analogous to the American Red Cross, to be administered by a representative
board of directors to see that the money was fairly distributed. Citizens were to
be urged to contribute to the national foundation regardless of their own political
affiliations, and the foundation was to distribute the funds collected, presumably
on a share and share alike basis, at least as far as the major political parties were
concerned. See McClellan Hearings at 827-44 and Albright, Vill Senate Stick with
Angels or Lobby on Lobby Probe, Washington Post & Times Herald, Feb. 26,
1956, reprinted at 102 CONG. REC. 3360 (1956).
31. N.Y. Times, June 3, 1955, p. 23, col. 2. The plan also received the support
of influential segments of the press, notably the Washington Post and Times
Herald.
32. See remarks by Senator Neuberger printed at 102 CONG. REc. A 769 (1956)
and the accompanying reprint of Lawrence, Butler Says GOP Upset Funds PlanDemocratic Leader Charges Foe Sabotaged Pact to Promote Contributions, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 25, 1956. The Democrats charged that Republican withdrawal from
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8
that the project was dead,3
despite the favorable prognostication
of repeated Gallup Polls indicating popular willingness to make
4
political contributions even without high powered advertising.

The Graham plan aroused interest not only among the top
brass of the national committees but also on Capitol Hill. The
legislators were quick to spot the one remaining crucial difference between the proposed campaign to collect political contributions and the ordinary charity campaign. Charitable contributions are, within limits, tax deductible. 8 Every solicitation
for Community Chest, Red Cross, school, and church prominently

features this fact. For experienced fund-raisers have found the
words "this donation is tax deductible" to be a magical key to

donors' hearts and pocketbooks, a key paradoxically far more
persuasive than the actual dollars and cents tax benefits to be
anticipated. 6 Political contributions are not, however, tax deductible under existing law. 7 To remedy this situation, several
the plan stemmed from the success of the nationwide Salute to Eisenhower dinners
which were estimated to have netted the Republican Party some $5,000,000. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 24, 1956, p. 1, col. 16, and p. 16, col. 5. See also 102 CONG. REC.
A1080 (1956).
Graham himself testified subsequently that the plan had probably been initiated
too late for the 1956 campaign. McClellan Hearings at 940.
33. See subsequent confirming statements in the New York Times, March 12,
1956, p. 12, col. 3.
Efforts by each party individually to canvass potential campaign contributors
continued. On the Democratic "Dollars for Democrats" campaign, see, e.g., statement by former President Truman at the Democratic National Convention, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 18, 1956, p. 8, col. 1, and interview with Roger L. Stevens, Chairman
of Finance Committee, Democratic National Committee, The Talk of the Town, 32
THE NEW YORKER 23 (Sept. 29, 1956). For a discussion of Republican financing,
see testimony of Chairman Hall, Gore Hearings at 27.
34. See report of Gallup Poll in Washington Post and Times Herald of Jan.
11, 1956, reprinted at 102 CoNG. REC. 2859 (1956). A 1955 poll suggested similar
readiness to contribute. Graham, High Cost of Politics, 44 NAT. MUNIC. REV.
346, 350 (1955).
35. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(c).
36. Cf. STEINBECK, SWEET THURSDAY 184-85 (1954).

37. Political contributions do not fall within the charitable contribution deduction, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 170(c), 501(c) (3). The latter subsection
explicitly limits tax exempt donees to organizations which do not "participate In,
or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements) any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office." For a liberal interpretation of the 1939 antecedent of § 170(c), see Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227
F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955), 18 MONT. L. REV. 112 (1956), holding that exempt
activities need only be substantially, and not exclusively, charitable.
Furthermore, neither political contributions nor lobbying expenses qualify for
deduction as business expenses. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 212, U.S. Treas. Reg.
118, §§39.23(0)-1(f), 39.23(q)-l(a) ; Textile Mills v. Commissioner, 314 U.S.
326 (1941). The entrepreneur lobbying in connection with legislation directly affecting his own existence is covered by this interdiction. See, e.g., Revere Racing
Ass'n v. Scanlon, 232 F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1956). But cf. Rev. Ruling 55-265, 1955-1
Cum. BULL. 22. Even the candidate's own expenses in securing or defining his
election are not deductible. McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57 (1944) ; Mays
v. Bowers, 201 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. 1953) ; Davis A. Reed, 13 B.T.A. 513 (1928) ;
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bills were immediately introduced, in June and July of 1955, to

provide limited tax deductibility for contributions to candidates
for federal elective office, and to committees acting in their be-

half. Senator Hennings and Representative Udall proposed deductibility for such contributions up to $100,8 while Senator
Wiley urged a $50 ceiling.39 Nothing more developed during the
First Session of the 84th Congress, and the matter might well
have rested there, but for the Case case in the spring of 1956.
Title Two of the omnibus bill, S. 3308, introduced by the Senate
40
leadership in response to public pressure generated by the case,
contained a tax deduction provision virtually identical to the
earlier Hennings proposal.4 1 Title Two was subsequently eliminated from the Senate Bill because of the constitutional requirement that fiscal legislation originate in the House; in the meanRobert Edward Kleinschmidt, 12 T.C. 921 (1949). This result obtains despite
the fact that any excess of contributions over expenditures is considered income to
the candidate. Rev. Ruling 54-80, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 11, modifying I.T. 3276,
1939-1 CuM. BULL. pt. 1, p. 108.
For general discussion and appraisal of these sections, see Bloom, Tax Result
of Political Contributions, 36 B.U.L. REV. 170 (1956), 34 TAXES 765 (1956) ;
Mann, Taxation - The Charitable Deduction: How Much Legislative Activity Is
Legal?, 1956 Wis. L. REV. 165; Seasongood, Contributions to a Taw-Eempt Local
Good Government League, 35 TAXES 103 (1957) ; Spiegel, Deductibility of Lobbying, Initiative and Referendum Expenses: A Problem for Congressional Consideration, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1957) ; Note, Deductibility of Lobbying and Related
Expenses, 42 A.B.A.J. 175 (1956) ; Note, Income Tax Disadvantages of Political
Activity, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 273 (1957) ; Note, Tax Treatment of Lobbying Ewpenses and Contributions,67 HARv. L. REV. 1408 (1954).
38. The Hennings Bill, S. 2302 (and its House counterpart, H.R. 7001), proposed adding a new Section 218 to part VII of Sub-Chapter B of Chapter I of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The salient provisions of the proposed Section
218 are as follows:
"(a) Allowance of deduction: In the case of an individual, there shall be
allowed as a deduction any political contribution (as defined in sub-section (c))
payment of which is made within the taxable year. A political contribution shall
be allowable as a deduction only if verified under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary or his delegate.
"(b) Limitation: The deduction under sub-section (a) shall not exceed $100
for any taxable year.
"(c) Definition of political contribution: For purposes of this section, the term
'political contribution' means a contribution or gift to "(1) An individual whose name is presented for election as President of the
United States, Vice-President of the United States, an elector for President or
Vice-President of the United States, a Member of the Senate, or a Member of the
House of Representatives (including a Delegate to the House of Representatives)
in a general or special election, in a primary election, or in a convention of a political party, for use by such individual to further his candidacy for such office; or
"(2) A committee acting in behalf of an individual described in paragraph
(1) for use by such committee to further the candidacy of such individual." The
bill is reproduced in full, accompanied by Senator Hennings' statement, at 101
CONG. REc. 9057 (1955).
The House Bill was H.R. 7001, 101 CONG. REC. 9139 (1955).
39. S. 2497. See 101 CoNG. REC. 10277 (1955).
40. See note 22 supra.
41. See text at 102 CONG. REc. 3441 (1956).
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time, however, a similar proposal had been reintroduced in the
House by Representative Mills. 42 Despite this flurry of interest,
the 84th Congress adjourned without taking any further af-

firmative action, and the same fate has befallen this last session's
4
bills on the subject.

At first glance, it is difficult to comprehend the lack of general enthusiasm for legislation to provide tax deductions for
political contributions. A casual observer might have anticipated an eager response, for such legislation would appear to be
in almost everyone's interest. For the legislator, it would facilitate financing his future campaigns; for the taxpayer, it would
provide an always welcome means of reducing his annual contribution to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Yet federal
reluctance to undertake such a scheme has been marked, 44 and,
interestingly enough, is not confined to the present membership
of the Congress. In response to a questionnaire circulated by the
McClellan Special Investigating Committee last year, a number
of former Senators expressed grave doubts about, and even direct opposition to, tax deductions.4 5 In contrast, a polling of
42. H.R. 9558, 102 CoNG. REC. 3423 (1956).
43. Senators Hennings and Javits reintroduced a bill for a $100 tax deduction, S. 920, 103 CONG. REC. 951-65 (Jan. 29, 1957), which was also introduced
in the House as H.R. 1440 by Representative Udall, 103 CoNG. REC. 1406 (Feb.
5, 1957), 103 CONG. REc. 1410 (Feb. 6, 1957). Senator Wiley again introduced
his bill for a maximum deduction of $50. S. 1406, 103 CoNG. REC. 2352, 2353
(Feb. 27, 1957).
A $100 tax deduction provision was also included in the original version of
S. 2150, the proposed Federal Elections Act of 1957. See note 22 supra.
44. Two states have enacted legislation permitting deductions from the state
income tax for contributions to political candidates. Minnesota pioneered in this
regard. Minn. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 775, amending MINN. STAT. §§ 290.21, 290.09
(1953). This statute is discussed in Mitau, The Status of Political Party Organization in Minnesota Law, 40 MINN. L. REV. 561, 567 (1956) and Roberts,
Campaign Donations, Washington Post & Times Herald, Feb. 9, 1956, reprinted
at 102 CoNG. REC. A1790 (1956). Similar legislation was passed at the 1957 session of the California State Legislature. Calif. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 255; CAIF.
REV. & TAX CODE § 17210 (Supp. 1957).
In New York, $100 deduction bills, sponsored by State Senator Williamson,
have twice passed the state Senate, but have gotten no further. The 1957 bill was
S.I. 75. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1957, p. 15, col. 1.
45. The McClellan Committee asked in question 9 of its questionnaire: "Should
tax concessions in the form of tax credit or a tax deduction from gross income be
allowed to encourage popular giving to campaigns?" Judge Ryan Duffy, former
Senator from Wisconsin, replied: "I might be willing to support a carefully worked
out program, but I think the proposal would be subject to many abuses." McClellan Hearings at 1296. Judge Carl A. Hatch, former Senator from New
Mexico, asserted: "Decidely not.... Abuses of campaign contributions will not be
corrected until all private contributions are prohibited." Id. at 1298. Tom Stewart,
former Senator from Tennessee, simply said: "No." Id. at 1298. So did C. Douglass
Buck, former Senator from Delaware. Id. at 1304. Arthur R. Robinson, former
Senator from Indiana, stated: "I doubt the advisability of allowing such deductions." Id. at 1305. Prentiss M. Brown, former Senator from Michigan, asserted:
"I do not favor any form of tax exemption." Id. at 1308. Zales N. Ecton, former

426

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XVIII

political scientists produced a nearly unanimous verdict in favor
of some form of tax concession for political contributions. 46 What
47
is it that has led to this odd result ?

Tax benefits for political contributions would, of course,
operate to deplete the internal revenue, and to that extent would
represent a federal subsidy of political campaigns. It has been
suggested in other contexts that the federal income tax base is

already subject to too many eroding deductions, credits, and exemptions. 48 Yet the likelihood of repeal of the present structure
seems slim indeed. Given the existence of tax concessions to
eleemosynary institutions, the extension of similar benefits to
our elective institutions is certainly warranted. Both sets of institutions can make persuasive claims on government support;
but if a choice between them were to be required, would it not
be more rational to award support to the elective institutions
which are at the core of our democratic system of government?
It is true that governmental support of political campaigns
need not necessarily be granted by the medium of tax benefits. 49
Senator from Montana, agreed that he "would not exempt any political contributions from the income tax." Id. at 1302. The most vehement rejection of the proposal came from Robert C. Hendrickson, former Senator from New Jersey, who
wrote: "Such concessions would lead to tax evasion and should not even be considered. They would also make for corruption of the election processes." Id. at
1302.
The total sample of 22 former Senators produced 10 affirmative answers, 8
negative answers, and 4 blanks in response to this question. Id. at 1290-1308.
See also the McClellan Report, S. REP. No. 395, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 127-29
(1957).
46. The McClellan committee asked, in question 17 of the questionnaire to the
political scientists: "Would you approve tax credit or deduction for political contributions? If so, what qualifications do you suggest? Have you given any thought
to the problem of administering such tax concessions?" The only negative response
came from Professor Neil A. McDonald of Rutgers University, who replied: "No.
Would tend only to benefit large contributors." McClellan Hearings at 1287. For
complete responses, see id. at 1267-90. For a short summary, see the McClellan
Report, S. REP. No. 395, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 135 (1957).
47. The oddity of the result is emphasized by the fact that the congressional
leadership, at least in the Senate, has repeatedly expressed itself in favor of such
legislation. It was Senators Johnson and Knowland, the majority and the minority
leaders, who, for example, included a tax deduction provision in their bill of last
year. See text at note 41 supra. And Senator Johnson expressly stated later that
tax deductions are "an important step in encouraging average citizens to take part
in the election of their public officials." N.Y. Times, March 18, 1956, p. 1, col. 4.
More recently, the influential members of the McClellan Special Committee to
Investigate Political Activities, Lobbying and Campaign Contributions recommended that "persons who make political contributions should be entitled to deduct
political contributions from gross income up to $100." "The effect," said the Committee, "of such a deduction would be beneficial in that it will make it less necessary for candidates to rely on large individual contributions and broaden the base
of contributors, a highly desirable goal." S. REP. No. 395, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
143 (1957).
48. Pechman, Erosion of the Individual Income Tam, 10 NAT. TAX. J. 1 (1957).
49. Such a direct subsidy has been urged by Senator Richard Neuberger of
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But a tax program has the important advantage of bypassing
the knotty problem of allocation posed by a more direct subsidy.
There is every reason to believe that the furnishing of tax incentives for political contributions should redound automatically
to the appropriate benefit of all political parties, large or small. 50
The major parties and their candidates would naturally be the
principal beneficiaries of the program. As between Republicans
and Democrats, the total benefit should be approximately the
same. While there are more registered Democrats across the
country than there are Republicans,"' Republicans are, on the

whole, more willing and able to make political contributions than
are Democrats. 52 A recent Gallup poll showed that, in reply to
the question, "If you were asked, would you contribute $5 to the
campaign fund of the political party you prefer?," 39% of the
Republicans said yes, while only 29% of the Democrats said
yes. 53 The same poll indicated, furthermore, that substantial financial returns are to be anticipated from a widespread cam-

paign for political contributions. Affirmative answers indicating a willingness to contribute $5 were received from a sample
representing 15,000,000 families, or 31% of the entire population. 54 The potential campaign fund of $75,000,000 thus arrived
at would certainly be considerably augmented by a well-organized collection campaign which could hold out tax as well as
"good citizenship" incentives for contributions.
Oregon, following a suggestion made by Theodore Roosevelt in a message to Congress on Dec. 3, 1907. S. 3242, 102 CONG. REC. 2831 (1956). The bill, often referred to as the Teddy Roosevelt Bill, is discussed in Neuberger, Who Should Pay
for Political Campaigns, N.Y. Times Magazine p. 25, June 3, 1956, reprinted at
102 CONG. REC. 12514 (1956). This proposal was adopted in Puerto Rico on June
30, 1957. See remarks of Senator Neuberger, 103 CONG. REC. 11894 (July 31,
1957).
50. There is a possibility that such tax benefits may lend additional support
to splinter parties. This danger seems to me to be a small one. Much greater
dangers would inhere in any program of governmental support of campaign financing which discriminated against existing or potential minor parties.
51. Dr. Gallup reported in January 1956 that there were 34,500,000 Republicans and 49,800,000 Democrats, as well as 14,200,000 voters who were uncommitted. These statistics are, of course, not completely accurate since cross-filing
is permitted in some states and since registration by party is not required in others.
52. The greater Republican willingness to make political contributions may be
attributable, in part, to the efficiency and thoroughness with which the Republicans
have long conducted their campaigns for campaign financing. See HEARD, MONEY
AND POLITICS 13, 22-23 (1956). Cf. the proven importance of proper fund-raising
techniques in charitable campaigns, text at note 26 supra.
53. This Gallup Poll was reported in the Washington Post & Times Herald of
Jan. 11, 1956, reprinted at 102 CONG. REC. 2859 (1956). Essentially similar replies were received in a similar Gallup Poll conducted in 1955. See Graham, High
Cost of Politics, 44 NAT. MUNIc. REv. 346, 350 (1955).
54. It is noteworthy that, according to these sources, only 2.7 million families
contributed to a political organization and only one family in 20 made any political contribution in 1954.
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Once the desirability of tax benefits for political contributions is established, the form which such benefits should take
becomes crucial. Viewed from this perspective, the flaw inherent
in most of the current tax proposals becomes apparent. To what
extent, after all, does a $100 tax deduction achieve the purpose
of encouraging "average citizens to take part in the selection of
their public officials ?"55 A deduction is meaningful only to that
minority of the taxpaying population which itemizes its deductions, in lieu of taking the so-called standard deduction. In 1953,
the latest year for which final statistics are available, only 25%
of all returns filed showed itemized deductions ;56 and in the income group reporting an adjusted gross income of less than
$5,000 (75% of all returns filed) 57 this figure dropped to 19%.1 8
Furthermore, even within the itemizing minority, a deduction
discriminates against the small taxpayer, the potential small contributor. For the amount of tax saving to be derived from any
deduction is a direct function of the taxpayer's net income
bracket. A low bracket taxpayer who donates a deductible $100
is contributing $80 of his own money and $20 of Uncle Sam's;
these figures reverse in the high income brackets. 9 A tax deduction plan is faulty, therefore, because it provides the higher income groups with by far the greatest incentive for political contributions. Few small taxpayers would be able to afford contributions of sufficient size to give significant tax advantages,
while large taxpayers would have everything to gain and virtually nothing to lose by their contributions. Some high income
bracket people might thus be induced to make a political contribution who would not otherwise do so; but the tax benefit might
well prove to be, in the main, a windfall for those who already
contribute large sums, and who would not be deterred from giv55. Statement by Senator Johnson about tax deductions on March 17, 1956.
N.Y. Times, March 18, 1956, p. 1, col. 4.
56. "There are 43.4 million returns on which the standard deduction was elected
by the taxpayer. This is 75 per cent of the total number of returns filed. However, it is the smallest proportion of returns to show use of the standard deduction
since 1946 when nearly 83.5 per cent of all returns had the standard deduction."
UNITED STATES INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME FOR 1953,
Part 1, at 6 (1957). For statistics on the years 1944-1952, see id. at 53.
57. 42,827,409 returns showed an adjusted gross income of less than $5,000,
and 422,299 returns showed no adjusted gross income whatsoever. Id. at 23.
58. Of the 43,249,708 returns filed showing a gross income of less than $5,000
(ia.
at 23), 34,855,675 made use of the standard deduction. Id. at 8. Thus only
8,394,033 of these returns were itemized.
59. A statistical breakdown of the benefit to the taxpayer of a $100 deduction
as a function of his gross income can be found in a speech by Senator Neuberger
at 102 CONG. REc. 4018-20 (1956).
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ing sizable amounts by any tax deduction ceiling. For these reasons, a tax deduction plan is unlikely to achieve its purpose.
There is, however, an alternative technique by which the tax
laws can foster popular participation in campaign finance. The
government can offer to the contributing citizen a tax credit, a
deduction not from gross income but from the final tax computation itself. A tax credit avoids the vices of the tax deduction: it
is available to all taxpayers,6 0 not only to those who itemize their
deductions; it is of equal benefit to all taxpayers, regardless of
their income tax brackets; it can be placed at an amount - $5,
say, or $10 - which the Gallup Polls indicate the average taxpayer would be willing to contribute. Such a credit need be no
more of a government subsidy than is a deduction. In fact, its
cost to the government is more readily calculable and can more
easily be altered by adjustment in the amount of credit permitted.6 1
The merits of a tax credit plan have not gone completely unnoticed. From a variety of sources, both academic and political,
a number of different plans have emerged since 1956. These proposals deserve serious and detailed scrutiny. For if the government is to bear part of the cost of campaign finance, it has a correlative obligation to prevent misuse of potential tax funds.
More so even than in the area of charitable contributions, 62 the
government must take careful precautions to prevent fraud and
coercion. At the same time its intervention and supervision
should interfere as little as possible with the citizen's political
freedom and his political anonymity. It therefore becomes crucial to decide many questions besides the proper maximum
amount of tax credit. Contributions by what donors to what
donees should be accredited as valid political contributions
entitling the donor to a credit? Should a tax credit be accompanied by a prohibition on individual contributions beyond the
credit ceiling? How can the credit be administered so that the
Treasury can satisfy itself that the taxpayer claiming the credit
has in fact contributed, without forcing the taxpayer to reveal
60. The category of taxpayers must of necessity be confined to those people who

(1) file tax returns and (2) owe a net tax.
61. Similar questions have arisen with regard to proposals for tax relief to
parents for the college education of their offspring. Here, too, many commentators have voiced their preference for a tax credit rather than a tax deduction plan.
See Editorial, Tax Relief Aid to Higher Education, San Francisco Chroncile, May
21, 1957, p. 22.
62. Cf. McMillen, Charitable Fraud: An Obstacle in Community Organization,
29 SOCIAL SERVICE REV. 153 (1955).
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his political affiliation? These problems are common to any tax
incentive plan, but they have been carefully considered only in
the context of tax credits, perhaps because the solutions suggested appear more workable in that context.
The first tax credit plan of any prominence was sponsored
by three social scientists at the University of Chicago. In March
of 1956, Professors Charles M. Hardin, Walter Johnson, and
Jerome G. Kerwin proposed amendment of the federal income
tax law "to permit individual taxpayers to subtract up to $5 each
from their income tax payments to the Treasury because of like
contributions to the political parties of their choice."0' 3 Their
plan did not purport to exclude other sources of campaign financing but it itself was restricted to donations to bona fide political parties, entities left undefined. An interesting administrative device for policing the credit was suggested. Bona fide
political parties were to purchase political contribution stamps
from the government at cost of production. These stamps were
then to be resold to taxpayer at their face value of $5. The stamp
when attached to a tax return would substantiate the claim for
credit without revealing the recipient of the political contribution. This stamp plan despite its pleasing simplicity has certain
latent dangers. The availability of stamps bearing a $5 face
value at nominal cost may invite fraud and vote-buying. An
unscrupulous individual or group might obtain a block of these
stamps for resale at a substantial discount. There would in fact
be no guarantee whatsoever that the taxpayer claiming the credit
had made any contribution to anyone to secure the stamp.
A few days after the Chicago plan appeared in print, Senators Neuberger and Humphrey introduced a bill for a tax credit
in the Senate. The bill was offered as an amendment to S. 3308,
the proposed Federal Elections Act of 1956, and was a substitute
for its Title Two which had provided for a tax deduction.6 4 The
Neuberger amendment called for a $10 tax credit for individual
taxpayers, 18 years or older, who made political contributions to
a candidate for elective federal office or to a committee acting in
behalf of such a candidate. 65 Verification of contributions was
63. Letter to the Editor of the New York Times, dated Feb. 20, 1956, printed
March 3, 1956, reprinted at 102 CONG. REC. A2275 (1956).
64. 102 CoNG. REC. 4020 (1956). See also text at note 41 supra.
65. Subsection (a) of the Neuberger amendment read as follows:
"(a). General rule. -In
the case of an individual over 18 years of age, there
shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable
year an amount equal to the political contributions made by such individual during
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left without further direction in the hands of the Secretary of
the Treasury, under such regulations as he might promulgate. 6
The wording of the bill left it unclear whether these regulations
were also to encompass criteria for establishing when a committee was acting on behalf of an elective federal candidate.
This bill, like the Chicago plan, did not purport to limit individual contributions to the credit ceiling.
Toward the end of June 1956, Walter P. Reuther, President
of the United Auto Workers, proffered still another tax credit
plan while testifying before the McClellan Special Committee to
Investigate Political Activities, Lobbying, and Campaign Contributions. Reuther suggested that individuals be permitted and
encouraged to contribute up to $5 each to their presidential,
senatorial, and congressional choices, and to one political organization or political action committee. He urged that the total
of $20 be a ceiling not only on the available tax credit but also
on all individual political contributions, and that the ceiling
should be lowered in any year in which there were no presidential or congressional contests. 67 Despite an earnest plea for
strict enforcement of federal election controls as necessary to
"transform any legislation into something more than paper
documents," the U.A.W. plan contains no specific suggestions for
administration of its tax credit suggestion. 8
The latest proposal for a tax credit has come from the Senate
Committee on Rules and Adminstration, in its favorable report,
the taxable year to the extent that such political contributions do not exceed $10."
Subsection (c) goes on to provide:
"(c). Definition of political contribution. - For purposes of this section, the
term 'political contribution' means a contribution or gift to "(1) An individual whose name is presented for election as President of the
United States, Vice-President of the United States, an elector for President or
Vice-President of the United States, a Member of the Senate, or a Member of the
House of Representatives (including a Delegate to the House of Representatives)
in a general or special election, in a primary election, or in a convention of a
political party, for use by such individual to further his candidacy for any such
office; or
"(2) A committee acting in behalf of an individual described in paragraph (1),
for use by such committee to further the candidacy of such individual."
66. Subsection (b) (2) of the Neuberger Bill provided for: "(2) Verification.- The credit allowable under subsection (a) shall be allowed only if the
political contribution or contributions with respect to which such credit is allowable
are verified under regulations precribed by the Secretary or his delegate."
67. I.e., a maximum of $20.00 in presidential election years, of $15.00 in congressional election years and $5.00 in off years. The $5.00 permissible contribution in any year could be given in connection with either a primary or a general
election campaign.
68. Washington Post & Times Herald, June 29, 1956, p. 2, UAW press release
of July 13, 1956, and McClellan Hearings 271-78.
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in August of 1957, on S. 2150.69 This bill, the so-called Federal
Elections Act of 1957, introduced earlier in the year by Senators
Hennings and Green, originally contained only a $100 tax deduction for political contributions. In committee it was, however,
amended to allow each taxpayer an option between such a deduction and a 50% tax credit (to a maximum of $10). 70 In
either case, verification of the legitimacy of contributions was
again left to the good offices of the Secretary of the Treasury.
Each of these plans has made a definite contribution to the
formulation of a realistic and workable tax credit for political
donations. The variety of approaches which they represent has
helped to bring into focus the important policy issues which must
be resolved. Perhaps a further attempt at such a resolution will
foster sufficient discussion and interest to produce some action
69. S. REP. No. 792, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). See note 22 supra.
70. The central provisions of §§ 501 and 502 of S. 2150 read as follows:
"Sec. 501. (a) Part IV of subchapter A of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (relating to credits against tax) is amended by renumbering section
38 as 39, and by inserting after section 37 the following new section:
"SEC. 38. CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES FOR ELECTIVE
FEDERAL OFFICE.
"(a) GENERAL RuLE.-There
shall be allowed to an individual, as a credit
against the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year, an amount equal to
one-half of the political contributions (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of
which is made by such individual within the taxable year.
"(b) LIMITATIONS. "(1) AMOUNT. - The credit allowed by subsection (a) shall not exceed
$10 for any taxable year.

"(3) VERIFICATION. - The credit allowed 'by subsection (a) shall be
allowed, with respect to any political contribution, only if such political contribution is verified in such manner as the Secretary or his delegate shall
prescribed by regulations.
For purposes of this section,
"(C) DEFINITION OF POLITICAL CONTRIBUTION.the term 'political contribution' means a contribution or gift to "(1) an individual whose name is presented for election as President of
the United States, Vice President of the United States, an elector for President or Vice President of the United States, a Member of the Senate, or a
Member of the House of Representatives (including a Delegate to the House
of Representatives) in a general or special election, in a primary election, or
in a convention of a political party, for use by such individual to further his
candidacy for any such office; or
"(2) a committee acting in behalf of an individual or individuals described in paragraph (1), for use by such committee to further the candidacy of such individual or individuals.
"(d) ELECTION TO TAKE DEDUCTION IN LIEU OF CREDIT. - This section shall
not apply in the case of any taxpayer who, for the taxable year, elects to take the
deduction provided by section 217 (relating to deduction for contributions to candidates for elective Federal office). Such election shall be made in such manner and
at such time as the Secretary or his delegate shall prescribe by regulations.
"SEc.
Code of
amended
following

502. (a) Part VII of subchapter B of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue
1954 (relating to additional itemized deductions for individuals) is
by renumbeiing section 217 as 218, and by inserting after section 216 the
new section:
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on S. 2150 or similar legislation when the 85th Congress recon71
venes in January.
One important issue to be decided is who should be entitled
to participate in a tax credit program. Senator Neuberger would
have no taxpayers under the age of eighteen eligible for tax
credits, and others have suggested a limitation to those of voting
age. While we may have no great stake in encouraging political
contributions from infants, it is doubtful whether the administrative burden of enforcing such a limitation is worthwhile, so
long as their political contributions are not otherwise outlawed.
A much more complex question concerns the qualifications of
tax credit donees. There would seem to be no reason to exclude
the candidates themselves from this source of campaign funds,
when it is the candidates whom we want to free from undesirable influences, after their election. Eligibility of candidates
for contributions is likely to encourage participation by the independent voter who is, rightly or wrongly, wary of party affiliation. For similar reasons, recognition of political organizations should depend on the candidate. With the exception of
the national and state committees of the major political parties, no political organization should be permitted to accept contributions for tax credit without the written public authorization of a candidate for federal elective office. Placing the responsibility for accreditation directly and openly upon the candidate should make it difficult for undesirable fringe groups of
either the left or the right to qualify. Furthermore, the candidate and his advisors are probably in a better position to make a
spot decision about the perspective of a new political group as
it emerges than an administrator in Washington would be; in
the course of a heated campaign, a slow affirmative decision
on such matters would often turn out to be equivalent to a negative one.
The writer's basic faith in the good judgment of the candidate and the electorate, when they are given a fair chance to
"SEC. 217. CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES FOR ELECTIVE
FEDERAL OFFICE.
"(a) ALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION. -In
the case of an individual there shall be
allowed as a deduction any political contribution (as defined in subsection (c))
payment of which is made by such individual within the taxable year.
"(b) LIMITATIONS. "(1) AMOUNT. - The deduction under subsection (a) shall not exceed
$100 for any taxable year."
71. See also statement by Professor Stanley S. Surrey of the Harvard Law

School, in McClellan Hearings, at 1257.
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exercise it, leads her also to doubt the advisability of correlating
the idea of a tax credit with any absolute ceiling on political
contributions. The wisdom and the administrative complexities
of any kind of ceiling on contributions, or expenditures, have
been sufficiently debated elsewhere.72 Suffice it to say here that
one of the major virtues of a tax credit plan should be its entirely permissive character. The thought is to provide, for the
candidate who is interested, one avenue for obtaining campaign
financing which will not prejudice his political freedom if he is
elected. Any candidate who would prefer some other kind of
financing should adopt whatever plan suits him, provided he
keeps the electorate sufficiently informed so that it is free to
make an intelligent appraisal of him.
The last major comments of this article concern the administration of the tax credit. The complexity of this problem arises
out of the need to reconcile the political contributor's right to
anonymity with the Treasury's obligation to verify the accuracy
of tax returns. The ordinary regulatory processes of the Internal
Revenue Bureau require full disclosure by the taxpayer; it is
difficult to see how Treasury verification would operate without forcing the taxpayer to state the name of the candidate or
political organization to which he had donated. All other things
being equal, such information should not have to be divulged in
a democracy.
Political contribution stamps, which obviate the need for disclosure of the donee, unfortunately raise serious verification and
distribution difficulties of their own. As we have seen, the Chicago stamp plan invites trouble because it releases political contribution stamps at nominal value, thus imposing on the government the risk of improper resale. Alternatively, the government
could make direct sales, at face value, to would-be contributors.
The stamps could be so designed that one part would be retained
for affixation to the donor's tax return, and the other delivered
to the donee for subsequent redemption from the government. 7
Appropriate formalities could provide adequate safeguards
against fraud ;74 there would be little incentive for cheating when
72. See sources cited in note 3 8upra.
73. Political scientists working with the Gore Subcommittee on Privileges
and Elections have suggested use of the postal money order and receipt as an
analogous method, familiar to the Post Office and to citizens at large.
74. The taxpayer could be required to attest when he was buying the stamp
that he was purchasing it for his own use, and when he was claiming the credit,
that he himself had purchased the stamp.
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the government was not extending credit. If, for example, an
organization bought stamps en masse to use as bribes, it would
be no better - and perhaps worse7 5 - off than if it were merely
to distribute $10 bills. But direct sales to contributors require
a sales agency. The only agency which readily comes to mind is
the Post Office, which already complains of overwork. Further,
direct sales to individual taxpayers make solicitation of contributions eligible for tax credit difficult. The potential donor must
be so firmly persuaded to make a contribution that he will make
a special trip for that purpose to the government vending agency
long after the enthusiasm of the rally or of the door-to-door
canvasser has worn off. All this suggests a second look at distribution through the political parties and other accredited
donees. Purchase of stamps by "donee beneficiaries" at face
value would certainly facilitate getting stamps to taxpayers while
still minimizing incentives for fraud. But here the danger looms
that not all parties and candidates will have equal liquid assets
to invest in the acquisition of stamps. It is possible that the very
candidate who most needs many small contributions would find
himself too impecunious to make use of this plan. Whether
short-term commercial loans could be floated to cover such a
contingency, if the Treasury were to agree to refund monies paid
for unused stamps, is not clear. What does appear, with some
certainty, is that a feasible plan, combining some or all of the
elements mentioned here, could be devised, and should be explored by the Congress, so that express directions about enforcing a tax credit could be given to the Treasury Department.
Finally, a word should be said about the amount of tax credit,
the amount of subsidy, which should be allowed. Experimentation in such a complex field as campaign finance should perhaps
begin on a modest scale. There is much to be said for the proposed limitation in S. 2150, allowing a maximum of a $10 credit
for a $20 contribution. Only an actual test will tell us how great
a drain on the resources of the Treasury this would be. In this
context, the proposal to allow taxpayers to choose between deduction and credit should produce useful comparative statistics.7 6
The important thing is to get this new method of political
financing organized in time to be effective for the 1960 elections,
75. If, as has been suggested, the credit were to be for only 50% of the contribution, the organization would have had to pay $20.00 for its $10.00 "bribe."
76. In other respects, a combination of tax deduction and .credit does not
obviate the criticisms of tax deductions discussed at page 426 supra.
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at the latest, to stop theorizing, and to start doing. The Advertising Council has long stood ready to sell our citizens on their
political responsibilities, 77 and the citizenry gives every indication in such a complex field as campaign finance should perhaps
is the crucial one of favorable enabling legislation from the
Congress.
77. See note 5 aupra.

